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COVID-19 impacts on destitution in the UK:  
Microsimulation projections by regions, sectors and household types  
Arnab Bhattacharjee* and Elena Lisauskaite**1 
We use microsimulation combined with a model of the COVID-19 impacts on individuals and 
households to obtain projections of households in destitution in the United Kingdom. The projections 
are estimated at two levels: aggregate quarterly for the UK, for all quarters of 2020; and annual for 
2020 differentiated by region, sector and household demographics. At the aggregate level, destitution 
is projected to be about three times higher than the non-COVID counterfactual level in 2020Q2, as 
well as substantially higher than the non-COVID case for the remainder of the year. This increased 
destitution is initially largely due to the effect on the self-employed, and as the Furlough scheme is 
drawn down, also on the unemployed. Impacts upon different regions and sectors vary widely, and so 
too are variations across different household types. The sectors particularly affected are construction 
and manufacturing, while London and its closely connected regions (South East and the Midlands) 
are most severely affected. Single adult households suffer the most, and the adverse effects increase 
with number of children in the household. That the effects upon the youth remain high is a particularly 
worrying sign, and very high increases in destitution are also projected for 25-54 year olds and the 
elderly people (75 years and older). Further, severe adverse effects are projected for sections of society 
and the economy where multiple impacts are coincident. Robust and sustained mitigation measures 
are therefore required. 
Keywords: COVID-19 crisis, destitution, unemployment, self-employed, regions, sectors. 
JEL codes: E24; I32; C53; J82; L00; R11.  
1. Introduction 
The COVID-19 crisis is a classic example of an unforeseen shock that is now expected to cause a deep 
recession, the adverse consequences of which are only beginning to be felt in the UK’s economy and 
society. With businesses closing down and thousands of people losing their jobs, once the Coronavirus 
Job Retention (Furlough) Scheme ends in October, the economy will suffer greater consequences than 
back in 2008 during the Global Financial Crisis. Different regions, sectors, and socio-economic groups 
are affected to varying extent (Rincón-Aznar et al., 2020). Moreover, the impacts will likely be 
exacerbated by the impending effects of Brexit. 
Against this backdrop, this article aims to look at the issue of destitution among different groups in the 
economy and the projected increase in the number of people living below the living wage threshold due 
to COVID-19 crisis. Following the Joseph Rowntree Foundation benchmarks, we take this threshold as 
the destitution level of income (Fitzpatrick et al., 2018). Here, destitution is defined as income that is 
so low that a household is likely to lack essential provision of shelter, food, heating, lighting, 
clothing/footwear and basic toiletries in the immediate future.i We start with a broader picture of where 
the economy is and where it is likely going in the next few quarters. We then turn to more detailed 
analysis of destitution, both at an aggregate level and various cross-sectional effects of COVID-19.  
The NIESR Review of May 2020 (NIESR, 2020) published a likely scenario of COVID-19 impact, 
where real GDP declined by 6.5 per cent and 16.5 per cent in 2020Q1 and 2020Q2, respectively, relative 
to the corresponding levels in 2019. Further large falls in GDP are projected until the end of this year. 
The contraction of the economy in turn leads to substantial increases in the unemployment rate, where 
it is expected to reach above 10 per cent by the end of the year. By comparison, the highest 
unemployment rate during the Global Financial Crisis was 8.5 per cent. However, we need to be very 
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cautious when drawing upon experiences from previous recessions. Unlike the recession in 2008, this 
time the economy is hit not through credit market shock, but rather through production stoppages that 
potentially affect lower paid sectors and poorer regions more adversely. Through decreasing income, 
even those in jobs and the self-employed may suffer. Therefore, it is important to collect evidence on 
rising destitution and to help support targeted policies. This is the central object of this article. 
2. Methodology and Modelling Assumptions 
In order to quantify the consequences of COVID-19 on the levels of destitution, we need a benchmark 
level of earnings below which we consider a person (or household) as destitute. As discussed above, 
we define destitution following Fitzpatrick et al. (2018) and the corresponding Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation benchmark. Specifically, we consider a single person household as having less than enough 
provision for food and basic necessities when their income falls below £70 per week. Any additional 
adult requires another £30 per week and an additional child needs £20 per week.  
Aggregate Projections at the UK level 
We begin with macroeconomic (aggregate) projections where our index individual is a person aged 16 
or above, and since we cannot distinguish between household types for this part of the analysis, the 
benchmark destitution income level is £3,640 per annum. Then, it is assumed that the COVID-19 impact 
on food banks arises from three sources: (a) people losing their livelihood (via unemployment), where 
this impact is moderated by the government's Furlough scheme; (b) those employed in jobs suffering 
reduced hours (and income) and thereby pushed into food poverty; and (c) self-employed workers 
moved to food poverty either because of income loss or because their businesses are not covered 
sufficiently by the government's small business schemes. More explicit modelling of households based 
on social, demographic heterogeneities by a microsimulation exercise is discussed later. 
We start from the likely scenario of quarterly growth published in NIESR (2020) to obtain projections 
of destitution in the UK, quarterly, from 2020Q1 to 2021Q1. This is done by taking estimates from the 
NiGEM (National Institute Global Econometric Model) (NIESR, 2018) model projections from the 
May 2020 Review (NIESR, 2020) and comparing these against the non-COVID counterfactual based 
on projections from February 2020. In doing so, we make some departures from the NiGEM output to 
model the government’s Furlough scheme.  
First, we project quarterly output based on the NIESR likely scenario, that is, fall in real output by 6.5 
per cent in 2020Q1, followed by further GDP declines in the subsequent three quarters (16.5 per cent, 
14.0 per cent, and 12.0 per cent for 2020Q2, 2020Q3 and 2020Q4, respectively), before starting to 
recover with a growth of 1.9 per cent in 2021Q1. Next, for 2020Q2 and 2020Q3, we retain productivity 
projections as obtained from NiGEM, but account for the Furlough scheme by keeping employment at 
the non-COVID counterfactual level. Then, earnings (at 2016 prices) are backed out by assuming 80 
per cent is paid at the non-COVID wages (by the government) and the remaining 20 per cent at the 
wage rate corresponding to the productivity levels.  
Second, in order to model different impacts upon unemployed persons, those in jobs and self-employed, 
we obtained a decomposition of self-employed workers within the employed population; see also Bell 
and Blanchflower (2020). Wage losses are expected to have different effects on employees and self-
employed workers as the latter group usually earn lower wages and is therefore more susceptible to 
income shocks pushing them into food poverty. In addition, some self-employed workers may not 
receive small business support from the government either because they pay lower taxes relative to their 
incomes or they largely pay themselves in dividends. We assume that there will be less job creation in 
the organised sector; hence, some people made jobless may become self-employed. We place this 
projection at the period of worst job creation in the recent times, which is December 2009 during the 
Global Financial Crisis.ii Self-employment rates were historically the highest in 2019Q4 at 15.3 per 
cent of the employed population, and under our projection, this rate increases to 20.3 per cent by 
2020Q3, and then falls slowly. 
Finally, we compute projections of destitution separately by composition of the labour force. For the 
unemployed, we use a time-series model relating growth in Trussell Trust food bank useiii (Trussell 
Trust, 2020) to unemployment rates and change in wages. For the employed persons, we draw upon 
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Round 6 of the UK Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS6), a representative sample for individuals from 
all regions of the UK except Northern Ireland. We project earnings by the fall in wages (as computed 
above) and then compute the proportion of 16 and over population whose earnings would then fall 
below the destitution threshold. For the self-employed, we also include workers who do not make a tax 
return (in WAS6, either pay very low taxes or pay themselves largely from dividends).  
Cross-sectional Impacts using Microsimulation 
In this section, we outline how we develop cross-sectional analysis of the COVID-19 crisis on the UK 
households in 2020, based on the output of microsimulation exercise using Lifetime INcome 
Distributional Analysis (LINDA) model (NIESR, 2016; van de Ven, 2017). LINDA takes as its base 
the nationally representative UK Wealth and Assets Survey Round 6 (WAS6) data for 2017, together 
with our modelling of the effects of COVID-19 crisis on the destitution levels in 2020. WAS6 does not 
cover Northern Ireland, hence we add to the sample a pseudo-sample representative of the region, 
accounting for differences in age distribution and drawing from a truncated WAS6 sample that accounts 
for differences in household earnings.iv 
The LINDA microsimulation model takes the above sample of individuals, and in each following year, 
until their eventual death at some random point in the future, applies to each individual: (a) random 
outcomes of education, household formation and dissolution, fertility, migration and mortality 
outcomes according to pre-specified menu of rates and transition probabilities; and (b) dynamic 
optimisation decisions on savings/consumption and work/leisure according to a well-specified micro-
founded economic model. Then, this generates simulated panel data on a pseudo-population 
representative of the UK population for each year from 2017 onwards. We consider this simulated 
population for 2020 as our non-COVID counterfactual (base) population.  
Following previous work on LINDA, one would then apply mortality rates, unemployment rates and 
wage declines for the year 2020 and run the model again to generate a COVID-19 pseudo-population 
for 2020 (covid), and finally proceed to comparison between the two populations.v We develop an 
alternate approach. In this alternative, we started from the LINDA pseudo-population for 2017. In terms 
of distribution by regions and household composition (number of adults and number of children), this 
matched the initial WAS6 data quite accurately. Then, we created a 1-1 mapping between the two by 
matching households, within each region and household composition cohort, by quantiles of wealth 
within the same cohort. Then, this household matching exercise allowed us to track each household 
(and its constituent individuals) through time to 2020. We applied our COVID-19 modelling to this 
pseudo-population for 2020 to obtain a covid population for comparison. 
To model the economy under the effects of COVID-19, we consider three main effects over the specific 
year under analysis, that is 2020. The most obvious one is the mortality rate, which we take from the 
official ONS statistics for March-April 2020 in England and Wales (ONS 2020; Miles et al., 2020) and 
make adjustments to reflect additional months and differential effects for Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. The mortality rates differ by age groups, with greatest impact on the population of elderly 
people. The second parameter that we model in order to reflect the impact of the COVID-19 crisis is 
unemployment rate, which is expected to increase rapidly to over 10 per cent by the end of the year 
(NIESR, 2020) as the extended Furlough scheme is drawn down, with larger effects especially on young 
people and older workers, and varying effects across different sectors. Finally, we model the change in 
household income due to fall in wages, unemployment, and businesses closing down temporarily or 
even permanently, taking into account Furlough scheme and support for self-employed workers. We 
model income change by sector explicitly, considering direct and indirect effects (Lenoël and Young, 
2020). Implied growth rates and unemployment rates are computed by sector, and corresponding wage 
declines are computed using the macroeconomic approach as outlined above. 
Given the nature of the underlying data, the results are reported at an annual frequency, specifically for 
the year 2020. We then contrast the base period for WAS6, the year 2017, against the year 2020, with 
and without the COVID-19 crisis. In order to analyse the impacts that the crisis brought to households’ 
well-being, we first look at the change in destitution from 2017 to 2020 assuming there were no crisis 
and then introduce the COVID-19 scenario to compare the base levels with the COVID-19 crisis.  
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3. Quarterly projections at the aggregate UK macroeconomic level 
Following quarterly projections of the likely economic growth from NIESR (2020) and the insights 
about working age population from the Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS6), we estimate the likely 
increase in destitution levels in the economy. Table 1 summarises the results. 
Table 1: Projections of the increase in destitution levels in the UK 
 
Channels of impact upon destitution Total number of 
adults (% above 
non-COVID) 
Destitution increase, 
percent of working-
age population 
Unemployed Lower wages in 
jobs 
Self-
employed 
2020Q1 582,830 44,502 44,219 671,551 (117.3%) 0.19% 
2020Q2 585,355 41,675 269,753 896,784 (194.3%) 0.81% 
2020Q3 696,423 40,393 108,296 845,111 (166.1%) 0.63% 
2020Q4 956,534 34,405 83,854 1,074,794 (165.6%) 0.79% 
2021Q1 1,139,189 39,963 38,662 1,217,813 (142.0%) 0.67% 
Source: Own calculations based on (a) NiGEM output from May 2020, and (b) our COVID model. 
The central takeaway here is the very large increase in destitution spread continuing over the year 2020 
and beyond. Half of the increase in 2020Q1 and two-thirds in 2020Q2 comes from self-employed 
workers, and the importance of this channel drops thereafter as the lockdown eases. Further, increased 
destitution through unemployment channel gains prominence in 2020Q2 even if the Furlough scheme 
is under operation. As the Furlough scheme ends in 2020Q4, unemployment is pushed up and this 
remains the predominant channel through 2021Q1. There will be loss of many lives and joblessness of 
those who survive will have long-term consequences (Fasih et al., 2020; Miles et al., 2020). Long-term 
unemployment leads to lower levels of human capital, lower earnings in the future, increases in income 
inequality and poverty levels. Policies to mitigate against these adverse impacts are the order of the day. 
4. Cross-sectional effects of COVID-19 on destitution  
With these insights from the aggregate view in place, we now proceed to a microsimulation analysis by 
region, sector and household types. Results of our analysis show that across all regions and sectors, the 
UK is facing a 250.4 per cent increase in destitution levels in 2020 in comparison to what it was in 
2017, which is 133.4 per cent higher than what it would have been in case if there were no COVID-19 
crisis. In order to target the most vulnerable parts of the economy, we need to explore further which 
areas are affected the most. In this section, we provide projections at the sectoral and regional levels in 
the UK, taking into account explicitly heterogeneity in the conditions facing different households, in 
terms of their demographic composition.  
Regional impacts 
Table 2 presents the change in destitution levels for different UK regions. London and its economically 
(and spatially) connected regions are the most affected. The highest increase is observed in the Midlands 
(East and West) with over 200 per cent difference in destitution levels to what it would have been had 
the crisis not happened. This result closely relates to sectoral effects as the hardest hit sectors are 
construction and manufacturing, and employment in these sectors in East and West Midlands was as 
high as 17 per cent of the entire regional employment (House of Commons, 2019).  
The smallest difference between non-COVID and COVID situations is observed in Wales and Northern 
Ireland. However, destitution in Wales, as reflected in the WAS6 data, was already high in 2017 in 
comparison to most other regions. Beyond sectoral composition, the differences in destitution can also 
be related to variation in household composition, age profile and different incomes (poorer regions have 
higher destitution levels). Another region that is highly impacted by COVID-19 crisis is the South East 
with 182.7 per cent higher destitution in comparison to non-COVID situation; this region has a high 
employment rate in public sector and trading and is also affected by its connections to London, the 
epicentre of the crisis.  
Table 2: Distribution of destitution by region (adults, 18+) 
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  Non-COVID destitution 
Non-COVID 
increase 
COVID 
destitution 
COVID 
increase 
Relative to 
Non-COVID 
  2017 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 
North East 19,589 67,812 246.2% 162,891 731.6% 140.2% 
North West 176,614 233,537 32.2% 477,783 170.5% 104.6% 
Yorkshire & Humber 92,699 187,823 102.6% 413,392 346.0% 120.1% 
East Midlands 47,960 89,702 87.0% 294,066 513.2% 227.8% 
West Midlands 95,672 134,431 40.5% 405,732 324.1% 201.8% 
East of England 180,056 169,393 -5.9% 395,679 119.8% 133.6% 
London 148,945 335,625 125.3% 844,378 466.9% 151.6% 
South East 203,045 189,088 -6.9% 534,513 163.2% 182.7% 
South West 89,863 168,219 87.2% 415,786 362.7% 147.2% 
Wales 125,199 160,901 28.5% 272,044 117.3% 69.1% 
Scotland 129,783 183,035 41.0% 379,521 192.4% 107.3% 
N. Ireland 55,063 128,829 134.0% 185,871 237.6% 44.3% 
Total 1,364,488 2,048,395 50.1% 4,781,658 250.4% 133.4% 
Source: Microsimulation (LINDA) modelling based on (a) 2017 nationally representative WAS6 data, and (b) our COVID model. 
Spatial dependence is not explicitly modelled in our COVID19 analysis, and neither are interdependent 
agents and externalities.vi Remarkably, it arises out of regional and sectoral patterns inherent in the 
WAS6 data. In fact, a statistical test (Bhattacharjee and Jensen-Butler, 2013; Angulo et al., 2018) fails 
to reject the hypothesis that spatial dependence in destitution incidence arises from a hot-spot epidemic 
diffusion weights matrix centred on London, with decreasing influence as one goes further away from 
the centre. This highlights an important feature of the microsimulation approach. 
Impacts by Household Composition 
Table 3 presents the distribution of destitution among different types of households in terms of 
composition (numbers of adults and children). As expected, single adult households (about 1/3 of the 
population) are more likely to face higher increase in destitution levels. There is also a higher increase 
in poverty among those with children, where the numbers are increasing with the number of children in 
the household. Then, the most significant increase is among single adults with 2 or more children. 
Beyond single and couples with up to 2 children, there are “other” household types either with more 
than 2 children or children with foster carers; they face 304.8 per cent higher destitution, but the number 
of such households is lower. This provides important evidence for benefit systems and targeted welfare. 
Table 3: Distribution of destitution by household composition 
  Non-COVID destitution 
Non-COVID 
increase 
COVID 
destitution 
COVID 
increase 
Relative to 
Non-COVID 
  2017 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 
Single adult 
      
– no children 622,414 749,848 20.5% 1,396,485 124.4% 86.2% 
– 1 child 207,471 682,181 228.8% 1,918,432 824.7% 181.2% 
– 2 children 140,989 519,970 268.8% 1,882,885 1235.5% 262.1% 
Couple 
      
– no children 767,010 799,877 4.3% 1,255,975 63.7% 57.0% 
– 1 child 256,069 295,458 15.4% 591,148 130.9% 100.1% 
– 2 children 102,427 118,183 15.4% 257,981 151.9% 118.3% 
Others 45,866 50,462 10.0% 204,295 345.4% 304.8% 
Total 2,142,246 3,215,980 50.1% 7,507,202 250.4% 133.4% 
Source: Microsimulation (LINDA) modelling based on (a) 2017 nationally representative WAS6 data, and (b) our COVID model. 
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Sectoral Impacts 
As evident in regional patterns, a significant proportion of the COVID-19 effects can be explained by 
regionally differing composition of economic activity in terms of sectors. The biggest impacts of 
COVID-19 relative to a counterfactual situation without the crisis are observed on the construction and 
manufacturing sectors (Table 4), both heavily affected by the lockdown, with 567.8 per cent and 279.4 
per cent differences between destitution levels with and without COVID-19 crisis, respectively. This is 
followed by mining, which is spatially located within long-run marginalised localities and communities.  
Table 4: Distribution of destitution by industry (adults, 18+) 
  Non-COVID destitution 
Non-COVID 
increase 
COVID 
destitution 
COVID 
increase 
Relative to 
Non-COVID 
  2017 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 
Public 465,320 430,269 -7.5% 1,315,069 182.6% 205.6% 
Pvt non-traded 
services 235,589 733,740 211.4% 1,340,750 469.1% 82.7% 
Real Estate 25,719 30,449 18.4% 49,368 91.9% 62.1% 
Construction 36,212 62,677 73.1% 418,534 1055.8% 567.8% 
Manufacturing 107,041 128,146 19.7% 486,211 354.2% 279.4% 
Mining 6,987 15,014 114.9% 47,123 574.4% 213.9% 
Private traded 263,050 287,256 9.2% 534,083 103.0% 85.9% 
Finance 78,136 77,567 -0.7% 75,289 -3.6% -2.9% 
Utilities 41,597 49,077 18.0% 83,475 100.7% 70.1% 
Inactive/No sector 104,837 234,201 123.4% 431,757 311.8% 84.4% 
Total 1,364,488 2,048,395 50.1% 4,781,658 250.4% 133.4% 
1. Source: Microsimulation (LINDA) modelling based on (a) 2017 nationally representative WAS6 data, and (b) our COVID model. 
2. Definitions of sector groupings: Public (Public administration, Education, Health, Collection/Sewerage); Private traded 
(Transport, ICT, Professional services); Real Estate; Finance; Construction; Private non-traded services (Wholesale/Retail, 
Accommodation/Food, Other services); Utilities (Agriculture, Electricity, Water); Mining; and Manufacturing.  
Figure 1: Sectoral composition of destitution in selected regions (adults, 18+) 
Public sector workers also face higher increase in destitution. However, this is against a lower base in 
case of no COVID-19, where expected destitution in the sector would have decreased by 7.5 per cent 
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in 2020 in comparison to 2017. Together with the public sector, the private non-traded sector also shows 
high projected destitution levels. By contrast, the impact upon the finance sector is negligible, and the 
effects on real estate, private traded and utilities are also moderate. This highlights one of the 
fundamental differences between the COVID-19 crisis and the 2008 Financial Crisis. In order to 
respond to the current situation, it is necessary to understand where the economy is hit most and who 
are the most vulnerable people. It becomes evident that the crisis has affected poorer people, lower paid 
industries and regions disproportionately, increasing destitution levels to extreme highs. 
The close connection between sectoral and regional patterns is quite remarkable (Figure 1), and here 
we also observe the high destitution levels for the economically inactive population. Sectoral patterns 
are often modelled using input-output matrices, and the direct and indirect effects in Lenoël and Young 
(2020) fall along the same tradition; a popular alternate approach is based on supply chains. In the recent 
literature, regional patterns have also been modelled by regional variations in sectoral composition 
(Elhorst et al., 2017; Rokicki and Hewings, 2019), which is very similar to our approach here. In the 
current context where trade is falling and traditional supply chains are under stress (Gasiorek et al., 
2020; Rincón-Aznar et al., 2020), the microsimulation approach taken here seems particularly potent. 
Impacts by Age 
Finally, we analyse the effects of the COVID-19 crisis on different age groups. Table 5 shows these 
young people (18-24 years) are facing extremely high increases (16 to 20 times) in destitution in both 
COVID and non-COVID scenarios. Possible reasons are high youth unemployment and financial 
distress.vii Foley et al. (2020) showed that among the most vulnerable are the young (18-24) as almost 
a quarter of workers from closed down businesses are below 25 years old. Those in education are also 
affected. New school leavers and graduates will likely be excluded from the market or moved to low-
paying jobs, which in turn will damage future employment prospects. This is extremely worrying as 
these figures together with persistent increases in youth unemployment raises a number of questions 
about the future of our economy and society.  
Table 5: Distribution of destitution by age group 
  Non-COVID destitution 
Non-COVID 
increase 
COVID 
destitution 
COVID 
increase 
Relative to 
Non-COVID 
  2017 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 
<18 years 777,758 1,167,585 50.1% 2,725,545 250.4% 133.4% 
18-24 years 25,332 418,679 1552.8% 503,305 1886.9% 20.2% 
25-54 years 257,591 1,062,501 312.5% 2,785,790 981.5% 162.2% 
55-74 years 1,021,955 283,968 -72.2% 849,731 -16.9% 199.2% 
75+ years 59,611 283,246 375.2% 642,832 978.4% 127.0% 
Total 2,142,246 3,215,980 50.1% 7,507,202 250.4% 133.4% 
Source: Microsimulation (LINDA) modelling based on (a) 2017 nationally representative WAS6 data, and 
(b) our COVID model. 
Very high increases in destitution levels are also projected for age groups of 25-54 and the elderly 
people (75 years and older). In the non-COVID scenario the increase in destitution for 25-54-year olds 
was projected to be well over 300 per cent even before COVID-19; however, it is close to 1,000 per 
cent after considering the impact of COVID-19 crisis. Therefore, comparing the economy under the 
two scenarios, people above 25 years old are projected to face much higher poverty after COVID-19 
effects are taken into account. 
5. Conclusion 
The COVID-19 crisis has led the UK, as well as other economies, into a deep and persistent recession. 
We explore cross-sectional patterns of the impact using projections of destitution by region, sector, 
labour market categories, household composition and age. The analysis was based on a combination of 
macroeconomic forecasts from NiGEM (NIESR, 2018) and the LINDA (NIESR, 2016) 
microsimulation model. WAS6 data from 2017, which is the latest nationally representative database 
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on household employment, income, and demographics, provided the base. This was complemented by 
our modelling of changes to mortality, unemployment and household incomes as a result of the COVID-
19 crisis. Then, LINDA generated a simulated population of the UK running annually through time. 
This analysis above presented results from the 2020 simulated population from LINDA. 
Overall, the impacts of the COVID-19 crisis, in terms of destitution, are devastating. More 
disconcertingly, the distributional impacts are highly asymmetric affecting different regions, sectors 
and segments of society in disproportionately diverse ways. It is apparent that those from disadvantaged 
areas and background, such as those from poorer families, most affected industrial sectors and low 
payed employees are suffering greatly. Important and sustained mitigation measures are therefore 
necessary. Beyond the Furlough scheme and assistance to small businesses, and beyond the recent 
changes to Universal Credit, the government must also continue to provide enhanced welfare support 
to the vulnerable, both directly to households and also through charitable organisations, and channels 
into employment for the youth. While the insights are revealing, like other projection exercises, the 
figures themselves must be treated with caution, not least because of higher uncertainty on the 
downside. 
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poverty’ based on 40 per cent of median income (after housing costs) (see, for example, Brewer et al., 2010), 
which would be about £5,200 for a single adult, £8,684 for a couple, £7,800 for a lone parent with 1 child, and 
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enhanced, of £4,955 for a single adult or £7,181 for a couple, and so on. We consider ’severe poverty’ benchmark 
as defined above as an alternate benchmark and verify that our findings are qualitatively comparable. 
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using a time series model. 
iv
 Comparable data from the Family Resources Survey shows that, in 2014/15, average weekly household income 
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v
 We attempted this approach; however, it was not adequate in this specific context. On average, across the pseudo-
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the rational expectations’ framework, together with the fact that credit constraints are not explicitly modelled in 
LINDA. Hence, we developed an alternate microsimulation approach which is unique to this context. In future 
developments with LINDA, we plan to incorporate temporary changes to the discount rate and risk aversion. 
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 Modelling interdependence between agents is the domain of agent-based modelling, which is an alternative to 
the microsimulation approach taken here. 
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 Evidence from the Understanding Society COVID-19 Study (Crossley et al., 2020), for example, show that on 
all considered measures of employment changes (whether employed, positive hours, hours worked and earnings), 
20-29 year olds score worst of all considered age-groups, both before and during the COVID-19 crisis (February 
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